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Abstract: 
Using CIS data from the Netherlands, Germany and France we test whether EU Frame-
work programs do have effects on their participants' R&D input and innovative output. 
From our Heckman selection equations, we conclude that the FPs attract the "elite" of 
European innovators. The question is whether, after correction for self-selection, the 
programs have positive effects on innovative behaviour. This is hard to test meaningfully 
among large firms as EU funding is likely to cover only a minor share of their innovative 
activities. Analysing changes in R&D input we find that smaller firms increase their 
R&D input quite substantially after entering an EU FP program. 
Estimating equations that explain sales of innovative products, we find that firms that 
collaborate on R&D with clients, suppliers, competitors or public research institutes do 
not have increased sales of innovative products. We try to provide explanations for this 
counter-intuitive finding. Moreover, participation in an EU FP neither increases sales of 
innovative products. This result holds after numerous robustness checks. 
We argue that our insignificant outcomes do not necessarily imply that the FP programs 
are worthless. There is independent evidence that innovative projects funded by the EU 
FPs do, on average, involve more technical and scientific risks, they are more complex, 
and involve longer time horizons. Obviously, they are farer from market introduction 
which is not surprising, given the regulatory demand that EU FPs should be "pre-compe-
titive". Against this background, we cannot exclude the possibility that an insignificant 
coefficient of FP participation in our equation on innovative output may still have a posi-
tive meaning. 
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I Introduction: The problem 
 
The Framework Programs (FPs) of the European Union consume substantial amounts of 
public money, and they involve a heavy bureaucratic burden for the participants and for 
the Commission. It is therefore legitimate to raise the question: is all that worth doing? In 
this paper, we address two questions. First, do the subsidies from the FPs lead to additio-
nal R&D efforts among the participants? And second, are R&D inputs, as initiated by the 
Framework Programs, used more efficiently in producing innovative outputs? 
 
In this paper, we use data from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) that directly 
measures innovation output. The CIS is asking firms whether, during the past three years, 
they have developed and introduced technologically new products that were either 'new 
to the firm' (i.e. already known in their market) or even 'new to the market'. While the 
former is an indicator of imitation, the latter covers what we might consider 'true' innova-
tions, defining an innovation as the market introduction of a new product. For the purpose 
of this study, we are mainly interested in innovation, rather than imitation. By dividing a 
firm's innovative sales by its total sales (or some other measure of firm size, e.g. em-
ployees), we obtain a measure of the output side of the innovative process. Relating a 
firm's innovative input (R&D) to its innovative 'output' (sales of innovative products) we 
can say something about the efficiency of the innovative process. A number of factors 
can influence efficiency, e.g. firm size, technological opportunities in the firm's sector of 
principal activity or possibilities for appropriation of innovation benefits. Below, we shall 
discuss such factors in more detail. 
 
In order to test whether the FPs have a positive impact on innovation, it is not sufficient 
to show that program participants innovate more than non participants. We need to con-
trol for the well-known Heckman self-selection bias. We therefore estimate a selection 
equation that informs us about typical properties of firms that participate in FPs. In other 
words, we test whether firms that participate in an FP are more innovative than are non-
participants, correcting for the fact that participants may be more innovative by reasons 
other than participation in an FP. 
 
Besides testing whether participants have higher innovative output, we also apply some 
refinements. By means of interaction dummies, we evaluate whether certain types of 
participants (e.g. smaller or larger firms; more or less R&D intensive firms or firms from 
certain sectors) do or do not achieve more innovative output if they participate in an FP. 
 
A priori, we expect firms that self-select themselves into FPs to be more innovative. This 
would result in an overestimation of our parameters for the properties that drive innova-
tion which we correct by means of a Heckman term for self-selection into the FPs. In ex-
plaining innovative output, we consider the following factors:  
• A firm's R&D intensity: Firms with intensive R&D efforts are likely to have a 
greater "absorptive capacity" and can therefore learn more quickly from others, 
and, in particular, from their partners in an FP. 
• We explore whether application of the famous Pavitt taxonomy1 could give inte-
resting distinctions. For example, "science based" innovators could take greater 
advantage from FP consortia with public research institutes (notably universities), 
while "specialized suppliers" might benefit more from participating in consortia 
that bring together clients and suppliers. 
• By comparing Greek data to those of Germany, France and the Netherlands, we 
hope to get a hint about whether PF participants from less-developed parts of the 
EU can benefit from "catching up" effects from collaboration with firms from 
richer countries. 
• Firms that have more generally a high propensity to collaborate on innovation 
might have more benefits from an FP, as they have experience in successfully 
managing collaborative R&D. 
In conclusion, we might achieve a double result: First, information about whether, in 
general, participants in FP's perform better (not because they are better innovators but) 
because they participate in an FP. Second (irrespective of whether the first question is 
answered by yes or no), we can find out which type of firm is particularly successful (or 
fails) to take advantage from participation in an FP.  
 
The reader should note that the critical factors mentioned above are all measured at the 
firm level in the CIS. We estimate equations that explain a firm’s innovativeness and add 
a dummy (or cross-dummies) for participation in Framework Programs.  
 
II A survey of the empirical literature 
 
There is a wealth of literature on the economic benefits of subsidies, such as EU Frame-
work Programs, for R&D, either collaborative or not. In mainstream economics, these 
subsidies are suspect but tolerated on the grounds that profit maximizing firms under-
invest in R&D  and there are positive externalities to R&D, such as spillovers to other 
industries and the acquisition of knowledge in the economy. A common criticism is that 
government subsidies ‘crowd out’ private investment in R&D (e.g. Wallsten, 2000). 
 
                                                 
1
 For a recent update of the famous Pavitt taxonomy (originally formulated in a 1984 Research Policy 
paper), see J. Tidd, J. Bessant & K. Pavitt: Managing Innovation, Chichester: Wiley, 2005 (3rd edition). 
In this paper we are predominantly interested in effects of EU Framework Programs, 
which are essentially subsidy programs for cooperative R&D, on innovative output. Ear-
lier research tended to focus on the consequences of subsidies for R&D expenses (David 
et al, 2000) and on the relation between R&D collaboration and innovative output, be-
sides research on the determinants of R&D collaboration. 
 
All studies investigating effects of R&D subsidies face a similar selection issue. Enterpri-
ses that receive subsidies for (collaborative) R&D could be different than enterprises that 
do not. Furthermore, based on these differences, they might be more likely to be granted 
subsidies and thus, select themselves into the subsidy program. All of this causes biases 
in estimating the effect of subsidy programs. This selection bias problem has been docu-
mented in the literature (e.g. David et al, 2000; Busom, 2000) to some extent. In more re-
cent research, this selection bias problem is typically dealt with, using a Heckman selec-
tion model or a matching approach. 
 
Research investigating the impact of R&D on innovation is widespread. With French CIS 
data Mairesse & Mohnen (2004) find that R&D expenditure per employee is positively 
correlated with all measures of innovation activity. With the same data source (CIS) for 
the Netherlands, in a longitudinal analysis, Belderbos et al (2004), find proof that R&D 
cooperation, in particular with universities, has a positive effect on growth of new to the 
market sales per employee.  In contrast to these findings, Negassi (2004) found only a 
minor role for R&D collaboration in achieving commercial success of innovations with 
French CIS data as did Brouwer & Kleinknecht (1996) with Dutch CIS data. 
 
A related strand of literature investigates the relation between receiving subsidies for 
R&D and subsequent private R&D expenditure. With CIS data for Sweden, Lööf and 
Heshmati (2005) find that public funds contribute to an increase in the total R&D efforts 
in Sweden, but the only beneficiaries are small manufacturing and service firms. The 
results rejected the crowding out hypothesis but they did support the hypothesis on the 
additive effect of public R&D support on private research expenditure, among small 
firms with 10-50 employees. With CIS3 and CIS4 data for Germany and Flanders, Aerts 
and Schmidt (2006) reject the crowding out hypothesis both when using a matching 
approach and when using a combination of the matching procedure and the difference-in-
difference method, i.e. conditional difference-indifference using the two cross-sections of 
CIS3 and CIS4. Their conclusion is that funded firms are significantly more R&D active 
than non-funded firms. 
 
 
III Data requirements 
In recent years, the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) allowed for numerous innova-
tion studies, which greatly enhanced the state of our knowledge. The core questionnaire 
of the CIS (as defined by Eurostat) includes a direct 'yes'/'no' question on whether a firm 
participated in Framework Programs. Unfortunately, the relevant question makes no dis-
tinction between FP 4 (1994-98) and FP 5 (1998-2002). Nor does it make a distinction by 
type of program. We believe, nonetheless, we can still make an appropriate test. Eurostat 
is undertaking efforts to make CIS micro data available for analyses. Unfortunately, the 
micro data by Eurostat cannot yet be linked at the firm level between subsequent CIS sur-
veys. Such a linking would be most desirable, as it creates panel data that would greatly 
increase the value of the CIS for research purposes. 
 
For the purpose of this study, we were able to link CIS 3 (covering year 2000) with CIS 4 
(covering year 2004) in three countries2. This allows for introduction of a time lag bet-
ween sales of innovative products and our exogenous variables (R&D input, R&D colla-
boration, participation in FPs, etc.). In order to investigate the selection mechanisms un-
derlying participation in Framework Programmes, we start with an analysis of typical 
properties of firms that participate in FPs. 
 
IV Properties of firms that participate in Framework Programs 
Firms that have no (or little) innovation activities would probably not pass through the 
tough selection procedures of the EU. A priori, we expect that participants should belong 
to the 'elite' of innovating firms in Europe. We expect them to have a substantial innova-
tion function, exceeding the average standards of their sector of principal activity; they 
might be experienced in R&D collaboration, and one might expect them to be large and 
oriented towards international operations.  
In the following, we take data from CIS 4 (covering year 2004) in order to test what are 
the typical properties of FP participants. As we have a binary variable (participation in 
FPs: yes/no?), we can use the simplest version of the logit model. The table 1 summarizes 
our outcomes.  
 
Other than expected, participants in FPs do not generally have above-average probabili-
ties of engaging into R&D collaboration, compared to non-participants. They do have 
higher probabilities of collaborating with clients, but not with suppliers (with the excep-
tion of France). In Germany, FP participants also have higher probabilities of collabora-
ting with competitors but this does not hold for the Netherlands, and it holds weakly for 
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 For Greece, we had access to both CIS3 and CIS4 waves, but apparently none of the firms ‘survived’ 
from the CIS3 to the CIS4 survey. 
France. It comes as no surprise that FP participants do collaborate more often with uni-
versities and public research institutes in all three countries, as Framework Programs in-
volve (and more or less require) collaboration with such institutes. Summarizing, we can 
say that participants in FPs tend to be more than average networked, although they are 
less networked than we had a priori expected.  
 
As expected, larger firms have higher probabilities of being involved in a Framework 
Program. While smaller innovators have the well-known advantages of smaller bureau-
cracies, shorter communication lines and higher flexibility, they have chronic problems 
of lacking resources (finance, knowledge etc.) and of missing scale economies (Tidd et 
al. 2003). Moreover, larger firms tend to have market power and monopoly profits that 
are helpful in launching risky products or in financing large R&D facilities over longer 
periods. It is no surprise that FP participants have R&D intensities above the average of 
in their sector of principal activities. Moreover, FP participants have a stronger interna-
tional orientation, which allows spreading the (sunk) costs of R&D over larger markets.  
 
The finding that FP participants are also more likely to hold patents supports the impres-
sion that they belong to the 'elite' of innovators, although patents are not necessarily a re-
liable indicator of innovation. Confronting innovative output to patenting activities, Brou-
wer & Kleinknecht (1999) conclude that firms that collaborate on R&D have higher pro-
pensities of applying for patent protection. The most likely explanation is that they do not 
trust their partners. Before engaging into R&D collaboration, they want to protect their 
most precious knowledge.3 This argument will also become relevant below. Hence, our 
finding (to be reported below) that FP participants have higher numbers of patents does 
not necessarily prove that they are more innovative. 
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 Brouwer, E. & A. Kleinknecht: 'Innovative output and a firm's propensity to patent. An empirical investi-
gation', in Research Policy, Vol. 28 (1999), p. 615-624. 
 Table 1: 
Factors that influence the probability that a firm will participate in FP 4 and/or FP 5. Evidence from 
the Dutch, German and French CIS. Summary of logit estimates 
 Netherlands Germany France 
 Coeffi-
cients: 
z-values: Coeffi-
cients: 
z-
values: 
Coeffi-
cients: 
z-values: 
Collaboration with suppliers -0,05 -0,39 0,14 0,98 0,14 2,60** 
Collaboration with clients  0,27 2,04** 0,54 3,98** 0,37 6,27** 
Collaboration with competitors 0,01 0,07 0,47 3,48** 0,13 1,91* 
Collaboration with universities 0,74 5,64** 0,82 6,32** 0,64 11,08** 
Firm size (employees) 0,00003 2,33** 4,53e-06 1,88* 0,0001 6,44** 
Firm's R&D intensity minus sector 
average 
0,017 4,58** 0,01 3,09** 1,48 8,26** 
Firm holds valid patents 0,59 6,28** 0,48 4,12** 0,25 5,26** 
Firm's most significant market is 
international 
0,26 2,75** 0,26 2,30** 0,30 6,32** 
Constant term -2,44 -35,32** -2,65 -
30,15** 
-2,38 -59,03** 
Number of observations 4.526 3.853 12.935 
Pseudo R-squared 0,20 0,36 0,20 
* significant at 90% level 
** significant at 95% level 
 
 
 
V Do PF participants have higher sales of innovative products? 
 
We analyze the impact of participation in FPs on sales of innovative products ('new to the 
market') rather than on imitative products ('new to the firm'). As indicated above, it is not 
sufficient to check whether FP participants have higher than average sales of innovative 
products. It might well be that firms are not 'good' because they participate in an FP, but 
they are participating in an FP because they are 'good'. We therefore correct our estimates 
by means of a Heckman selection equation. 
We also control for a number of other factors that contribute to sales of innovative pro-
ducts. Inclusion of these other factors implies that we test a number of hypotheses. 
Among these are the following: 
• Firms that collaborate on R&D should (ceteris paribus) produce higher innovative 
output, as they enjoy a number of advantages. First, they can share costs and risks 
which should enhance subsequent sales. Second, they can exploit complementary 
knowledge, which should save costs and shorten the time-to-market. Being earlier 
on the market should favour sales. Third, firms that collaborate can 'internalize' 
positive externalities; their collaboration partners turn from competitors (or imita-
tors) into supporters of the new product, which should be favourable for sales. Fi-
nally, collaborators should have a higher chance of determining a dominant stan-
dard. All this would lead us to expect that firms that engage in R&D collaboration 
should have (ceteris paribus) higher sales of innovative products than those who 
do it alone.  
• By the reasons just mentioned, we would expect FP participants also to show 
higher sales, although much of the R&D in a Framework Program is pre-compe-
titive. Considering the time distance between, on the one hand, FP 4 (1994-98) 
and FP 5 (1998-2002) and, on the other hand, the new product introduction period 
(2002-2004), we would expect that advantages derived from FP participation 
should be discernible in sales of innovative products in the year 2004. Perhaps 
this holds less for FP 5, but it should certainly hold for FP 4. 
• Many people who use the output indicator from the CIS ignore an important limi-
tation of this indicator: It is not suitable for comparisons across industries. The 
typical lengths of the life cycles of new products can differ between industries. 
For example, in food or clothing industries, life cycles tend to be short, while in 
aircraft construction they are fairly long. An industry with shorter (longer) life 
cycles will exhibit higher (lower) rates of new product introduction.4 As questions 
about length of life cycles tend to be badly reported in postal surveys, we use as 
an alternative the average sales of innovative products in a firm's sector of prin-
cipal activity. Inclusion of this latter variable implies that we actually explain 
whether a firm's sales of innovative products deviate from the average of the 
firm's sector of principal activity. This variable should also capture unobserved 
sector-specific influences on innovation. In a number of tentative estimates, it 
turned out that sector dummies (including versions inspired by the Pavitt taxono-
my) became insignificant, once we included this variable. Of course, we expect 
this variable to be highly significant, implying that an individual firm's sales of in-
novative products are strongly determined by the average standards of its sector. 
• As we are interested in a possible increase of innovative sales in 2004 (compared 
to 2000), we also include a firm's sales of innovative products in 2000 as an ex-
planatory variable. We assume that participation in FPs during 1994-98 and 1998-
2002 will have effects on innovative sales in 2004, but not yet in 2000. 
                                                 
4
 Explaining a firm's innovative sales, Brouwer & Kleinknecht found that life cycle length is indeed highly 
significantly negative. This confirms that the longer are the life cycles in a sector, the lower is the probabi-
lity that a firm will have introduced new products and the higher are the shares of new product sales in total 
sales. See Brouwer, E. & A. Kleinknecht: 'Firm size, small business presence and sales of innovative pro-
ducts', in Small Business Economics, Vol. 8 (1996), p. 189-201.  
• As R&D intensity can differ tremendously across sectors, we use the deviation of 
a firm's R&D intensity from the average of its sector of principal activity. Of 
course, we expect firms with above-average R&D intensities to also show sales of 
innovative products above sector average. 
• We control for firm size. By the reasons mentioned above, we have no a priori ex-
pectations about the sign of the coefficient of firm size. Typical advantages of 
smaller firms (notably flexibility) might be offset by typical disadvantages (e.g. 
lack of resources). 
• Following evidence for 'demand-pulled' innovations,5 we include growth in a 
firm's total sales during 2002-4 as a control variable. 
• Finally, we include control variables for two more types of firms. First, for firms 
that are part of a foreign conglomerate. Such firms may introduce new products 
from the mother company, without necessarily performing R&D themselves. Se-
cond, we control for firms that underwent a major organizational change due to a 
merger or acquisition. The problem with these types of firms is that, due to orga-
nizational turbulence, the quality of data reporting in a survey may be poor. 
                                                 
5
 The 'demand-pull' hypothesis goes back to the seminal work by J. Schmookler: Invention and economic 
growth, Cambridge: HUP, 1969. For a recent survey of research on demand-pull see Brouwer, E. & A. 
Kleinknecht (1999): 385-391. 
 Factors that influence logs of sales of innovative products per employee in 2004 ('first on the market'; 
introduced during 2002-2004)  
Independent variables: (measured in CIS 3, 
covering the year 2000) 
Netherlands Germany France 
 Coeffi-
cients: 
t-
values: 
Coeffi-
cients: 
t-
values: 
Coeffi-
cients: 
t-
values: 
Firm collaborated on R&D with suppliers (d)$ -0,13 0,63 -0,07 -0,28 -0,05 -0,50 
Firm collaborated on R&D with clients (d) -0,19 -0,91 -0,25 -0,91 -0,11 -0,94 
Firm collaborated on R&D with competitors (d) -0,07 -0,36 0,09 0,29 -0,07 -0,55 
Firm collaborated on R&D with universities (d) -0,11 -0,52 -0,07 -0,30 0,07 0,58 
Industry average of logs of sales of innovative 
products per employee 
 
0,90 
 
4,54** 
 
0,13 
 
0,47 
 
0,39 
 
2,56** 
Firm's R&D intensity minus industry average 0,03 2,11** 0,007 0,82 0,78 1,43 
Log of firm's sales of innovative products per 
employee in 2000 
 
0,48 
 
7,18** 
 
0,54 
 
5,69** 
 
0,32 
 
8,66** 
Firm size (number of employees) -0,00001 -0,36 -7,77e-06 -1,95* -1,31e-06 0,79 
Demand-pull (growth of firm's sales in 2002-4) 0,003 3,72** 0,003 0,71 -0,00003 0,74 
Firm is part of a foreign conglomerate (d) 0,06 0,48 -0,004 -0.01 -0,04 0,69 
Firm had a merger or acquisition leading to 
>10% turnover change in 1998-2000 (d) 
 
0,34 
 
1,48 
 
0,04 
 
0,10 
 
0,34 
 
1,81* 
Firm held patents valid in year 2000 (d) 0,74 4,13** 0,23 0,68 0,03 0,22 
Interaction term: Firm participated in FP 
and has an above-average R&D intensity 
 
0,05 
 
0,13 
 
-0,79 
 
-1,84* 
 
0,03 
 
0,32 
Interaction term: Firm participated in FP 
and has a below-average R&D intensity 
 
1,02 
 
1,73* 
 
-0,81 
 
-1,90* 
 
n.a.# 
 
n.a.# 
Constant term -4,91 -5,19** 0,56 0,61 1,03 2,21** 
Number of observations 1176 494 1217 
Significance of Chi2 test 0,0000** 0,000** 0.000** 
* significant at 90% level 
** significant at 95% level 
$
 (d) = dummy variables 
#
 Variable was dropped due to collinearity. 
 
Heckman selection equation: 
Independent variables: (d) = dummy variables Netherlands Germany France 
 Coeffi
cients: 
t-values: Coeffi-
cients: 
t-values: Coeffi-
cients: 
t-
values: 
Firm's R&D intensity minus industry average 0,003 0,50 0,003 0,49 -0,20 -0,47 
Log of firm's sales of innovative products per 
employee in 2000 
 
0,17 
 
5,84** 
 
0,14 
 
2,77** 
 
0.04 
 
1,55 
Firm size (number of employees) 0,0001 2,99** 2,33e-06 0,71 0,0002 4,77** 
Interaction term: Firm participated in FP and 
has an above-average R&D intensity 
 
0,22 
 
1,01 
 
-0,09 
 
-0,29 
 
-0,14 
 
1,79* 
Interaction term: Firm participated in FP and 
has a below-average R&D intensity 
 
0,14 
 
0,41 
 
0,03 
 
0,11 
 
n.a.# 
 
n.a.# 
Firm held patents valid in year 2000 (d) 0,44 5,18** 0,73 5,78** 0,61 7,87** 
Constant term -1,22 -9,53 -0,82 -2,62** -0,37 -3,45** 
Number of observations 1176 494 1217 
* significant at 90% level 
** significant at 95% level 
$
 (d) = dummy variables 
#
 Variable was dropped due to collinearity. 
 
 
A number of observations differ between the three countries. First, the deviation of a 
firm's R&D intensity from the average of its sector of principal activity is a significant 
predictor of innovative sales in the Netherlands. It is only weakly significant, however, in 
France and insignificant in Germany. Second, industry-average sales of innovative pro-
ducts are highly significant in the Netherlands and in France, but not in Germany. Third, 
the 'demand-pull' variable is highly significant in the Netherlands but is insignificant in 
Germany and France. Forth, firms holding valid patents in year 2000 have significantly 
higher sales of innovative products in the Netherlands, but not in Germany and France. 
We have the impression that the insignificance of various variables in Germany might 
come from some noise in the German data, German response rates and sample sizes be-
ing smaller than in the Netherlands and in France. Firm size does not make a difference 
in the Netherlands; in Germany, smaller firms seem to have higher sales of innovative 
products (significant at 10% level).  
 
The following observations are consistent between the three countries: 
• R&D collaboration with whatever partner (suppliers, clients, competitors or uni-
versities) has no impact on innovative sales in both countries; 
• Not surprisingly, in all three countries, a firm's innovative sales in 2000 are a 
strong predictor of innovative sales in 2004; 
• Being part of a foreign conglomerate or having had a merger or acquisition ap-
pears to have little impact on innovative sales; 
• Participation in FP 4 (1994-98) and/or FP 5 (1998-2002) has in all three countries 
hardly any impact on innovative sales. This generally holds for other versions of 
our estimates, e.g. when taking simply a dummy variable for 'participation' or 
when using various types of interaction terms (e.g. firms size times 'participation' 
or sector times participation). 
 
Besides the versions documented in the table, we experimented with numerous alterna-
tive regression specifications in order to test the robustness of the results. These robust-
ness checks were satisfactory. Most of the coefficients in the table changed only very 
little when adding (or omitting) some control variables or when defining them slightly 
differently. 
 
While many outcomes are intuitively plausible, two findings merit closer discussion. 
First, firms that collaborate on R&D with clients, suppliers, competitors or public insti-
tutions do not perform better or worse than firms that do it alone. Second, participants in 
FP 4 and/or 5 do not have more innovative sales than non-participants. In both cases, 
there are good reasons to expect that innovative inputs should be used more efficiently as 
firms that collaborate on R&D or participate in Framework Programs have a number of 
distinct advantages: 
• They can share costs and risks; 
• They can use complementary knowledge; 
• They can internalize each other's knowledge spillovers; i.e. the project partners 
are being turned from competitors (or imitators) into defenders of the innovation; 
• They have a higher chance of determining the dominant standard in the market. 
 
How does it come that we nonetheless find no significant effect of R&D collaboration or 
of FP participation on sales of innovative products? Of course, participation in collabora-
tive R&D or in FPs also has obvious disadvantages. First, the management and coordina-
tion of the collaborative projects absorb some time and effort. Second, notably in inter-
country collaboration, cultural mismatch and physical (travel) distance between partners 
can play a negative role for efficiency. Third, collaboration partners often need to under-
take extra efforts for the protection of their intellectual property, for example by acqui-
ring patents or copyrights, as they want to be protected against opportunistic behaviour of 
their partners. Such factors lead to a loss of time and money and this will compensate 
some of the obvious advantages from collaboration. 
 
Another possible explanation could relate to the type of projects that is undertaken in col-
laboration. In principle, the Framework Projects are 'pre-competitive'. This would lead us 
to expect that commercial exploitation of results should follow the projects with conside-
rable time lags. As we measured participation in FP 4 (1994-98) and FP 5 (1998-2002), 
we would expect that at least participation in FP 4 should have some results during the 
period covered in CIS 4 (i.e. innovations introduced during 2002-4).  
 
Another question relates to why firms collaborate. Suppose, you have an idea for an inno-
vative project that looks like a gold mine. Why should you invite collaboration partners 
with whom you have to share the gold mine? Two possible answers to this question could 
be: (1) The firm has not enough readily available knowledge for doing it alone; or (2) the 
project looks promising, but is surrounded with strong risks and uncertainties and there-
fore you feel a need for sharing costs and risks. The latter could apply to somewhat exotic 
technologies such as nano technology or super conductivity where it is important to keep 
up with developments, although commercial use may be far away. In such cases, cost 
sharing through collaborative research may be more than welcome.  
 
It is reasonable to expect that firms will do the least risky and most profitable projects 
themselves, independently of whether they receive some funding from the EU or not. 
Successful application for participation in an EU funded project may lead them to doing 
perhaps also the more risky projects.  
 
From the considerations above, one would expect that EU-FP projects are, in one or the 
other way, more risky, more complex, more distant from the firm's core competencies, or, 
putting it briefly: in one or the other way more 'difficult'. Evidence from an independent 
survey among FP participants as well as case studies among participants do indeed con-
firm this (Polt et al., 2007). Against this background, the above insignificant coefficients 
for R&D collaboration and for participation in FPs would in fact carry a positive mes-
sage: in spite of doing more 'difficult' projects, futures sales from the difficult projects are 
not less than the sales from 'easier' projects. 
 
Independently of this, one can also investigate whether participation in FPs leads to extra 
R&D efforts. If it holds that subsidization of R&D through the Framework Programs 
leads to extra R&D efforts, then the above insignificant coefficients imply that the extra 
R&D (due to subsidization by the EU) is not less efficient than the R&D that firms would 
be ready to undertake from their own money (without subsidization). 
 
 
VI Do subsidies lead to increased R&D efforts? 
 
Ideally, one would like to answer the following question: How many Euro of R&D will a 
firm spend, on average, for each Euro of R&D subsidies received? Answering this ques-
tion would require firm-level data on R&D budgets prior to and after subsidization and 
on amounts of subsidies received. The latter data are not available in the Community In-
novation Survey. Fortunately, there is still a second-best solution. The CIS data allow 
answering the following question: Does participation in FP 4 (1994-98) and/or FP5 
(1998-2002) have an effect on the change in a firm's R&D intensity between 2000 and 
2004? 
 
We estimate an equation that explains a firm's R&D intensity in 2004, including, besides 
some control variables, a dummy variable on whether the firm participated in FP 4 and/or 
FP 5 and the firm’s R&D intensity in 2000. It would have been better if we had infor-
mation only on participation in FP 5 (1998-2000), but participation in FP 4 and/or FP 5 is 
not asked for separately in the CIS questionnaire.  
 
In interpreting our results, one should be aware that the impact of participation in an FP 
on a firm's R&D budget is likely to differ considerably between smaller and larger firms. 
The smaller a firm, the bigger should be the impact of participation, simply because the 
relative importance of the R&D subsidy to the firm's total R&D budget is likely to be 
higher among smaller firms. In larger firms that are likely to have multiple R&D projects, 
the EU subsidy may only be a minor share of the total R&D budget. This is likely to re-
sult in smaller (and possibly insignificant) coefficients among larger firms. We therefore 
include a cross-term in our equation: participation in FPs times firm size class. In order to 
correct for self selection we again include a Heckman term. 
 
 
Does participation in FP 4 (1994-98) and/or FP5 (1998-2002) have an effect on changes in R&D 
intensities between 2000 and 2004? 
(Estimates with interaction terms: participation times firm size class) 
 Netherlands Germany France 
 
Independent variables: 
Coeffi-
cients: 
z-values: Coeffi-
cients: 
z-
values: 
Coeffi-
cients: 
z-values: 
R&D intensity in 2000 0,47 12,38** 0,23 2,11** 0,44 4,43* 
Firm size (employees) -0,00009 -1,44 -0,00001 -2,12** -3,15e-17 -0,04 
Interaction term: smaller firm times 
participation in FP4 or FP5 
0,69 1.82* 0,72 2,31** 1,78 2,49** 
Interaction term: medium-sized firm 
times participation in FP4 or FP5 
0,18 0,78 -0,55 -1,21 0,49 1,13 
Interaction term: big firm times parti-
cipation in FP4 or FP5 
0,07 0,20 -0,02 -0,05 -0,39 -0,91 
Firm's most significant market is 
international 
0,33 3,05** -0,20 -0,93 0,62 1,56 
Firm holds valid patents by the end of 
2000 
0,26 2,37** 0,14 0,58 0,37 0,95 
Constant term 1,50 5,32** 0,49 0,72 -2,39 -3,28** 
       
Selection equation:       
R&D intensity in 2000 0,07 3,88** 0,11 3,71** 0,11 3,51** 
Firm size (employees) 4,83e-06 0,34 5,49e-07 0,17 0.00004 3,06** 
Firm participated in FP4 or FP5 0,46 4,10** 0,27 2,52** 1,64 13,49** 
Constant term -0,86 -26,77** -0,58 -3,32** -1,35 -9,35 
       
Number of observations 2519 1113 1795 
Significance of Chi2 test 0,0034** 0,0000** 0.1019# 
* significant at 90% level 
** significant at 95% level 
#
 The Chi-square test indicates that a Heckman specification is not really necessary, since we cannot reject (at the 5 or 
10% level) the null-hypothesis of independence between the selection and regression equations. In other words, in the 
French case, a simple OLS estimate would have been sufficient. 
 
 
The above estimates show that, not surprisingly, firms having high R&D intensities in 
2000 again have high R&D intensities in 2004. Moreover, in the Netherlands, firms that 
are more internationally oriented and firms that hold patents have significantly higher 
R&D intensities in 2004 compared to locally oriented firms or firms having no patents. 
This observation does not hold for Germany and France. As expected, distinction by firm 
size makes an important difference in all three countries. Participation by smaller firms 
(less than 100 employees) leads to a strong and significant increase in R&D intensities. 
Participation in FPs by medium-sized (100-499 employees) and by large (500 and more 
employees) firms, however, has no significant impact on R&D intensities. 
 
The coefficients for firms with less than a hundred employees are 0.69 in the Netherlands 
and 0.71 in Germany. Tentative calculations suggest that these coefficients come down to 
quite a substantial change in R&D intensities. After control for other influential factors, a 
firm with less than a hundred employees will, on average, increase its R&D budget bet-
ween the year 2000 and year 2004 by roughly a 100% if it participates in FP 4 and/or FP 
5. In the case of France, the coefficient of 1.78 indicates that R&D intensity would even 
more than double. In interpreting these estimates we need to take into account that the 
confidence intervals around these estimates are rather wide. Therefore, the point esti-
mates need to be read with caution. We nonetheless trust that there is a significant in-
crease in R&D efforts if smaller firms participate in a Framework Program. 
 
 
VII Summary, conclusions and discussion 
 
We investigated the possible chain of causality from subsidies for R&D collaboration in 
EU Framework Programmes to innovative output. The most important intermediary vari-
able is (collaborative) R&D both inside and outside the EU Framework Programs. Re-
sults from our logit analysis on Framework Programme participation suggest for The 
Netherlands, Germany and France that Framework Programmes attract the elite of 
innovators in Europe. This is an important finding since it confirms the well-known self 
selection biases that are associated with many subsidy programs. Therefore in exploring 
the impact of FP participation on innovation we employed a Heckman type of analysis in 
order to correct for these biases. 
 
Innovative output does not seem to be enhanced by participation in EU Framework Pro-
grams in France, Germany, and in The Netherlands. This result remains valid after nume-
rous robustness checks. Another remarkable result is that innovative output is neither en-
hanced by other forms of R&D collaboration outside the Framework Programs. We try to 
offer explanations for these counter-intuitive findings. One might wonder whether our 
failure to find an effect has to do with the time-lags between exogenous and endogenous 
variables that are dictated by the structure of the data. Of course, the available data are 
not ideally suited to our purpose. On the other hand, a time lag between participation in 
FP 4 (1994-98) and/or FP 5 (1998-2002) and innovative output produced during 2002-4 
seems to be not too far from what we want to measure.  
In interpreting our outcomes, one should be aware of evidence that collaborative projects 
undertaken under the EU Framework Programs tend to involve higher scientific and tech-
nical risks, they are scientifically and technically more complex, involve longer time ho-
rizons and are (due to regulatory requirements) farer from market introduction (i.e. they 
need to be 'pre-competitive'), compared to 'normal' (collaborative or other) R&D projects 
(Polt et al., 2007). In short, collaborative R&D under the Framework Programs tends to 
tackle projects that are, in one way or the other, more 'difficult' than normal R&D 
projects. Against this background, our finding of insignificant coefficients does not 
necessarily prove that EU Framework Programs are inefficient. In any case, sales of 
innovative products from more difficult FP projects are not less than the sales from more 
easy R&D projects outside the FPs.  
 
Our test on 'input additionality' with respect to extra R&D carries a positive message for 
firms with less than a hundred employees (among larger firms we find no such effects). 
That is, we tested whether FP program participation resulted in crowding out of private 
investment in R&D. For that purpose we have analysed growth of R&D expenditures in 
the period following participation in Framework Programs. We find substantially larger 
R&D intensities among smaller firms in the period after participation in an FP, which is 
between 0 and 8 years after the FP participation. This result was found for the Nether-
lands, Germany and France with the latter showing the largest effect. The data did not 
allow for precise measuring of crowding out, but this finding suggests that crowding out 
effects of FP programmes are fairly limited in the countries under scrutiny in this paper. 
 
To conclude, EU Framework Programmes do not have a positive impact on innovative 
output. Given the more 'difficult' character of these projects, our insignificant outcomes 
do not necessarily carry a negative message. On the other hand, we do find quite conside-
rable 'input additionality', at least among smaller firms. It seems that the FP programs do 
serve a purpose in the sense that they could correct under-investment by private firms in 
R&D.
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